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Abstract
This paper presents a New Keynesian (NK) model that is extended to di¤er-
entiate between straight time and overtime work. The model proposes that the
New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) should be estimated with marginal cost
measured in terms of overtime labor; the resulting coe¢ cient estimates are in accor-
dance with theory and statistically signicant for the hybrid NKPC (which allows
for backward-looking price setters) but not for the purely forward-looking NKPC.
In the hybrid model, backward-looking behavior is found to be predominant. The
paper also shows that the incorporation of employment frictions (predetermined em-
ployment and convex adjustment costs) in NK models helps reconcile the frequent
price changes found in the microdata with the degree of sluggishness in ination
adjustment to output changes at the macro level.
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1 Introduction
New Keynesian (NK) models have, by combining price stickiness with monopoly power at the
rm level, contributed greatly to a better understanding of ination dynamics. Despite their
popularity these models have also been subject to criticism. Noticeably, Rudd and Whelan
(2007) question the ability of these models to t the data (in particular statistically insignicant
estimates of the overall slope coe¢ cient on marginal cost) and the use of the labor share as the
appropriate measure of real marginal cost (one would expect marginal cost to be procyclical,
since workers require a higher real wage in order to be induced to supply extra hours, which
does not seem to be the case for the labor share).1
To address these issues, this paper extends the NK model to di¤erentiate between straight
time and overtime work.2 Several facts motivate the introduction of overtime labor as important
for the study of business cycles, ination and marginal costs. Hansen and Sargent (1988),
using a vector autoregression (VAR) approach, nd that overtime work appears to adjust more
rapidly to output innovations than full time employment.3 Also, the number of persons working
overtime (dened as working 41 hours and over) represents about 29% of the US workforce.
Since overtime is paid at a signicant premium (which must be at least 50% of the straight
time hourly wage as mandated in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938) such a large share
suggests that it plays an important role in how rms react to unexpected shocks.4 These facts
indicate that many rms are likely to be constrained in the short run in adjusting their total
employment and resort to overtime work in order to respond to unexpected uctuations.5
As the model and evidence indicate that marginal cost should be measured in terms of
overtime costs, I construct a marginal cost measure using data on overtime labor. Unlike the
labor share, marginal cost measured in overtime is shown to be procyclical. I then use this
overtime-based marginal cost measure to estimate the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC)
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via generalized method of moments (GMM). The resulting coe¢ cient estimates for the slope
coe¢ cient on real marginal cost of the purely forward-looking NKPC are negative and thus at
odds with NK theory. The coe¢ cient estimates, however, become both positive and statistically
signicant once the NKPC is augmented (in order to capture the apparent inertia in ination
observed in the data) to include some dependence on lagged ination (which is found to be
quantitatively dominant, therefore implying that the purely forward-looking model cannot be
seen as a good approximation to ination dynamics).
Another important criticism is that standard coe¢ cient estimates of New Keynesian models
imply that rms reoptimize prices roughly once every six quarters (Galí and Gertler, 1999).
This is inconsistent with an average of less than two quarters found in the microeconomic data
(Klenow & Kryvtsov, 2005). I show how the incorporation of employment frictions (predeter-
mined employment and convex adjustment costs) helps reconcile reduced form estimates of NK
models with the frequent price changes found in the microdata.
In particular, I assume that rms must commit to the number of workers they will em-
ploy before observing shocks to the economy (and face convex adjustment costs in changing
employment numbers) but are free to adjust the number of employees working overtime. The
introduction of employment frictions allows a reinterpretation of econometric estimations of
the NKPC. If employment frictions are taken into account then the sluggishness in ination
adjustment to output changes becomes compatible with frequent price adjustments by rms.
This happens because the presence of employment frictions represent a real rigidity in the sense
of Ball and Romer (1990) which strengthen the degree of strategic complementarity among the
pricing decisions of di¤erent rms. The same e¤ect can be seen in rm-specic capital models
but to a much smaller extent (this happens because labor represents a much larger share of
rmscosts than capital).
The model presented here builds on Halls (1996) paper. Hall also assumes the number
of workers to be predetermined (but not that rms face convex adjustment costs in changing
workforce numbers) and that rms resort to overtime work in order to adjust to unexpected
uctuations. I di¤er from Hall by assuming that rms have monopoly power and are subject
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to Calvo price stickiness as in conventional New Keynesian models, thus allowing for a role for
monetary policy that does not exist in Halls model. Bils (1987) also considers marginal cost
to be a function of overtime work, estimating a marginal wage schedule from average hours per
worker (which includes part-time workers) in manufacturing. I compute marginal costs from
actual data on overtime work in nonagricultural industries.
Other important empirical references are Mazumder (2010) and Ravenna and Walsh (2008)
who estimated the NKPC with models that also allow for adjustment along both the intensive
and extensive margin in hours and Batini, Jackson and Nickell (2005) who presented evidence of
the importance of employment adjustment costs in NKPC estimation. The work in this paper
is also related to the literature on rm-specic capital. Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Linde (2011), Sveen and Weinke (2004) and Woodford (2005) also depart from the assumption
of rental spot factor markets and studied the implications for sticky price models of standard
restrictions to capital formation.
2 The models
In this section I describe two business cycle models with sticky prices. The baseline model
consists of an otherwise standard New Keynesian model which is extended to di¤erentiate
between straight time and overtime employment. The model therefore allows for adjustment
along both the intensive and extensive margin in hours. This change suggests that marginal
cost may be better measured by costs with overtime labor and not by the labor share of income.
In the next subsection I add employment frictions (rms must commit to the number of workers
they will employ before observing shocks to the economy and face convex adjustment costs in
changing their full time workers) to the baseline framework. In the last subsection I compare
the two models implications with respect to ination dynamics and price frequency adjustment.
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2.1 A New Keynesian model with overtime labor
2.1.1 Households
Consider an economy with a continuum of identical innitely-lived agents on the interval [0,1]
who have preferences over consumption of a single nondurable good Ct and leisure Lt.
The utility of each agent is
1X
s=0
s(
1
1  Ct+s
1  + v
1
1  L
1 
t+s ) (1)
where 0 <  < 1 is the subjective discount factor, v is the utility from leisure and is strictly
greater than zero,  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and  is the labor supply
elasticity.
Each household is endowed with T units of time each period. L can take one of three values:
-T if the agent is unemployed;
-T   h1 if the agent is employed but works the straight shift only;
-T   h1   h2 if the agent works both the straight and overtime shift.
I follow Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) and employ lotteries to convexify the commodity
space. The end result is the utility specication below (see the web appendix for details), which
is similar to the one used by Hansen and Sargent (1988) and Hall (1996)
1X
s=0
s[
1
1  Ct+s
1    a1(N1;t+s  N2;t+s)  a2N2;t+s   a0(1 N1;t+s)]; (2)
where a0   v 11 (T )1 ; a1   v 11 (T   h1)1 ; a2   v 11 (T   h1   h2)1 ; N1;t is the
share of agents who work the straight time shift (full time employment) and N2;t is the share
of workers who work both shifts (overtime employment). This representative agent chooses
a set of stochastic processes fCt+s; N1;t+s; N2;t+sg1s=0 to maximize (2) subject to the following
sequence of budget constraints
Ct = (Dt +W1;th1N1;t +W2;th2N2;t + Tt + TRt   Et fQt;t+1Dt+1g)=Pt; (3)
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where Pt is the price of the nal good,W1;t is the nominal hourly wage of the straight shift,W2;t
is the nominal hourly wage of the overtime shift, Dt is the nominal payo¤ of the portfolio held
at the end of period t, Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor, TRt are government transfers
and Tt denotes rms prots. The price of a one period bond is given by R 1t = EtQt;t+1 where
Rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate.
The resulting rst-order conditions (FOC) are
R 1t = Et

(Ct+1=Ct)
 (Pt=Pt+1)
	
; (4)
W1;t
Pt
h1Ct
  = (a1   a0); (5)
W2;t
Pt
h2Ct
  = (a2   a1): (6)
These conditions represent the optimal consumption/savings and labor supply decisions of the
economys representative agent (it is important to note that wages are assumed to be exible
in this model).
2.1.2 Firms
Final good rms The nal consumption good, Yt, is produced by a perfectly competitive
representative rm. The rm produces the nal good by combining a continuum of intermediate
goods (Y (i); i 2 [0; 1]) using a Dixit-Stiglitz technology
Yt = [
1Z
0
Y
( 1)=
t (i)di]
=( 1): (7)
Prot maximization implies the following demand for the ith good:
Yt(i) = (Pt=Pt(i))
Yt; (8)
where Pt is an index cost of buying a unit of Y
6
Pt = [
1Z
0
P
1 
t (i)di]
1=(1 ): (9)
Intermediate good rms Each intermediate good is produced by a monopolist rm accord-
ing to the following production function
Yt(i) = At(h1N
1 
1;t (i) + h2N
1 
2;t (i)); (10)
where At represents the level of technology, assumed to be common to all rms and to evolve ex-
ogenously over time (according to an autoregressive process ln(At)=(1 A)ln(A)+Aln(At 1)+"At
where "At is a zero mean white noise process). The above production function is similar to the
one used by Hansen and Sargent (1988) and Hall (1996).6
The ith intermediate good rm chooses Pt(i); Yt+j(i); N1;t+j(i); N2;t+j(i) to maximize prot
subject to (8) and (10) as well as its price-setting constraints and takes Pt+j, Yt+j; W1;t+j; W2;t+j
as given. Formally, it maximizes
1X
j=0
jEt fQt;t+j[Pt(i)Yt+j(i) W1;t+jh1N1;t+j(i) W2;t+jh2N2;t+j(i)]g ; (11)
where  is the probability the rm will not be able to optimally reset its price in a given period.
The resulting rst-order conditions are:
Et
1X
j=0
()jt;j
Pt
Pt+j
Yt+j(i)[Pt(i)  Pt+jMCt+j(i)] = 0; (12)
W1;t=Pt
(1  )AtN 1;t (i)
=MCt(i); (13)
W2;t=Pt
(1  )AtN 2;t (i)
=MCt(i); (14)
where PtMCt(i) denotes the Lagrange multiplier with respect to the production function con-
straint and can be interpreted as the rms marginal cost, t;j = (t+j=t) = (Ct+j=Ct)  and
 = =(  1) is the steady state markup of price over marginal cost.
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The rst order condition for the rms price setting behavior (equation 12) is similar to
the standard New Keynesian model (price is a function of all future expected marginal costs).
Equation (13) and (14) imply that inputs adjust to equalize the marginal cost across di¤erent
factors, where the marginal cost of a factor is the ratio of the factor price to the marginal
product. Equation (14) is particularly important since it suggests that overtime labor costs
(and not the rms total labor input costs) should be used to proxy marginal cost. In constrast,
the empirical literature starting with Galí and Gertler (1999) has focused on the labor share or
output gap to proxy marginal cost (an exception is Mazumder, 2010).
2.1.3 Market clearing and monetary policy rule
Market clearing in the goods market requires
Yt = Ct (15)
this equation represents the economys aggregate resource constraint. Finally, when prices are
sticky the equilibrium path of real variables cannot be determined independently of monetary
policy. In other words: monetary policy is non-neutral. The model is closed by assuming the
central bank follows a simple interest rule of the form:
rt = t + yyt + st (16)
where t = pt   pt 1 is ination and lower case letters are used to denote variables in log
deviation from the steady state. st is a monetary policy shock which follows an AR(1) process:
st = sst 1 + "
s
t where "
s
t is a zero mean white noise process.
2.2 A New Keynesian model with overtime labor and employment
frictions
In this section I introduce employment frictions to the New Keynesian model outlined previ-
ously.7 The basic structure is identical to the model presented in section 2.1, the only di¤erences
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are that rms must now choose N1;t(i) before the shocks to the economy are known and face
convex adjustment costs when changing the number of full time employees. The adjustment
cots function is
Ht(i) = H(
N1;t+1(i)
N1;t(i)
)N1;t(i); (17)
whereHt(i) represent purchases by the rm of the nal good. The functionH() is an increasing
and convex function, of the usual kind assumed in neoclassical investment theory which satises,
near a zero growth rate of employment, H(1)i = N1, H 0(1) = 1 and H 00(1) =  N1, where N1
is an exogenous separation rate and the parameter  N1 measures the employment adjustment
costs in a log-linear approximation to the equilibrium dynamics. This implies that in the steady
state to which the economy converges in the absence of shocks, the rate of hiring required to
maintain the economys employment is N1 times the steady state employment N1. This allows
N1 to be interpreted as the exogenous quit rate in employment. It also implies that near the
steady state, a marginal unit in hiring expenses increases employment by an equal amount
(as there are locally no adjustment costs). These assumptions are similar to those made by
Woodford (2005) and Sveen and Weinke (2004) in a context of capital adjustment costs.
In this model the ith intermediate good rm must choose Pt(i); Yt+j(i); N1;t+j+1(i); N2;t+j(i)
to maximize prot, which is now given by
1X
j=0
jEt fQt;t+j[Pt(i)Yt+j(i) W1;t+jh1N1;t+j(i) W2;t+jh2N2;t+j(i)  Pt+jHt+j(i)]g (18)
subject to (8), (10) and (17) as well as its price-setting constraints and takes Pt+j, Yt+j; W1;t+j;
W2;t+j as given. The rst-order condition for the rms price-setting behavior (12) and for
N2;t+j (14) remain identical. Only the rms optimal employment decision, previously given by
(13), is changed. It is now given by
H 0(
N1;t+1(i)
N1;t(i)
) = Ett;1[t+1(i) +
N1;t+2(i)
N1;t+1(i)
H 0(
N1;t+2(i)
N1;t+1(i)
) H(N1;t+2(i)
N1;t+1(i)
)]; (19)
with
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t+1(i) =  
W1;t+1
Pt+1
h1 +
W2;t+1
Pt+1
h2
MPN1;t+1(i)
MPN2;t+1(i)
; (20)
MPN1;t+1(i)
MPN2;t+1(i)
= N2;t+1(i)
h1
h2
N 1;t+1(i) = [
1
h2
Yt+1(i)A
 1
t+1  
h1
h2
N1 1;t+1(i)]
=(1 )h1
h2
N 1;t+1(i); (21)
where the second equality is obtained by using (10) to substitute out N2.
(19) takes a similar form to the FOC for the rms investment decision found in Sveen and
Weinke (2004) or Woodford (2005). It should be noted that a rms marginal return to N1 is
measured by the marginal savings in its overtime costs as opposed to its marginal productivity.
This arises from rms being demand constrained, which implies that a rms benet from
having an additional worker derives from the fact that this allows it to produce the quantity
demanded with less overtime work.
It is also important to observe that while equation (12) which describes the rms price-
setting behavior remains unchanged, the rms choices here are more complex than in standard
sticky price models. Since a rms choice of full time employment is among the determinants
of its marginal product of labor, I cannot solve the price setting problem without considering
the rms optimal employment behavior. The reason for this is that N1 is not purchased on
a spot market. A rms marginal cost therefore depends on its present full time employment
numbers and these depend on the rms decisions in previous periods, including its price-
setting decisions. This problem, however, is very similar to the case of rm-specic capital
solved by Woodford (2005). Following Woodford (2005), I solve this problem by means of an
undetermined coe¢ cients method.
The rms optimality condition for N2 given by (14) is also unaltered with respect to the
previous model. However, when employment is predetermined overtime labor costs become the
only way to measure marginal cost. For this reason, in the empirical section I will focus only
on (14) as an alternative marginal cost measure to the labor share.
The economys resource constraint (15) is also changed and is now given by
Yt = Ct +Ht; (22)
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where
Ht = [
1Z
0
Ht(i)di]; (23)
stands for aggregate employment adjustment costs.
2.3 Ination dynamics
In both models the economys price ination equation takes the form
t = Ett+1 + mct; (24)
where  is a function of the models structural parameters and lower case letters are again
used to denote variables in log deviation from the steady state.8 This equation is often referred
to as the NKPC.
The dynamic relationship between ination and average real marginal cost may be identical
in structure for both models, but the magnitude of  is di¤erent between the models. In the
New Keynesian model with no employment frictions we have that
 =
(1  )(1  )

; (25)
with  = 1 
1 +  1. This is identical to the Basic New Keynesian model (e.g., Galí, 2008), so
the introduction of overtime employment in the model does not imply any important change
in the dynamic relationship of ination or on the numerical magnitude of . Notice, however,
that  is strictly decreasing in the index of price stickiness, , and in the measure of decreasing
returns  (this occurs because under decreasing returns to scale ( > 0), marginal cost is no
longer independent of the level of production and, hence, is not common across rms). This
means that for a given value of  a larger  implies a smaller degree of price stickiness (a lower
).
The introduction of employment frictions, however, does change the predicted slope of the
Phillips curve trade-o¤ to an extent that can be quantitatively signicant. When employment
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frictions are present this slope is given by
 =
(1  )(1  )

 1N1; (26)
with
 1N1 =
1  
1  + 
h
1 + h1
h2
(N1
N2
)1 
i
+ '(; ; ; h1;h2;N1;N2;; 1; 2)
;
where 1 and 2 are the coe¢ cients to be determined using the method developed in Woodford
(2005). Woodford (2005) shows that a non-explosive solution to the rms decision problem
exists in the case of large enough adjustment costs. Note that
h
1 + h1
h2
(N1
N2
)1 
i
> 1 and '() 
0; so one can conclude that  1N1    1 (these inequalities are strict if  > 0). This
happens because employment frictions consist of real rigidities in the sense of Ball and Romer
(1990) which strengthen the degree of strategic complementarity among the pricing decisions
of di¤erent rms.
3 Model estimation
This section describes the dataset used, how to construct a real marginal cost measure based
on overtime labor and the GMM estimates of the reduced form Phillips curve.
3.1 Data
The data used will be quarterly (employment numbers and interest rates series were converted
to quarterly by averaging monthly observations), seasonally adjusted, U.S. time series.9 The
endogenous regressors necessary to estimate the NKPC consist of ination (the log di¤erence
of the GDP deator) and a measure of real marginal cost. Two alternative real marginal cost
measures will be used in the estimation. The labor share, which is also referred to as real unit
labor cost (RULC), and a new marginal cost measure based on overtime costs. To construct
the latter I make use of employment and hours data series from the BLS Current Population
Survey as well as data on real GDP and real compensation per hour in the nonfarm business
sector. The employment and hours series are: N1;t (persons who worked 35 hours and over per
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week), N2;t the share of persons working overtime (number of persons who worked 41 hours and
over per week) and the average overtime hours shift (h2;t).10
For the exogenous instruments I will make use of lagged variables of the endogenous re-
gressors and also the output gap (obtained by quadratically detrending real GDP per capita),
wage ination (the log di¤erence of real compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector),
commodity price ination (the log di¤erence of the commodities consumer price index ) and
the long-short interest rate spread (the log of the 10 year treasury rate minus the log of the 1
year treasury rate).
All data was obtained from either the BLS or the St. Louis Fed website.11
3.2 Constructing a marginal cost measure based on overtime labor
Equation (14) suggests that marginal cost should be a function of overtime labor. This is
common to both models described in section 2. However, to compute it one needs a series for
aggregate productivity (At). Fortunately, this can easily be estimated from the data at hand.
Rearranging the production function (10) shows that At should equal Yth1N1 1;t +h2N1 2;t
. Assuming
 to be 0:33 and h1 equal to 516 (the quarterly value for the straight time shift if one assumes
it to be 40 hours per week), it is then easy to construct a series for aggregate productivity
At =
Yt
h1N
1 
1;t + h2;tN
1 
2;t
: (27)
by using data on real GDP per capita (Yt), the average overtime hours shift (h2;t), N1;t and
N2;t.12 I then construct the following measure of real marginal cost, which I will refer to as real
overtime labor cost (ROLC):
ROLCt =
(1 + pr)Wt
(1  )AtN 2;t
(28)
where W denotes real compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector (in levels) and pr
for the wage premium on overtime hours. This gives a measure of real marginal cost consistent
with the model outlined in section 2 (see Eq., 14). Finally, since the NKPC is written in log
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deviations from the steady state, I take the log of the resulting series and de-mean it (this
means that the end series is not a¤ected by the choice of value of pr as this term e¤ectively
cancels out).
Figure 1 displays the ROLC series and the other two more commonly used measures of
marginal cost in the literature: the demeaned log of the labor share (RULC) and H-P detrended
real GDP per capita (yt). Two observations are striking about this gure. The rst observation
is how much more volatile the ROLC is than the other two marginal cost measures. The second
observation is that the ROLC series is characterized by large short run movements but with
quick return to its mean (its persistence is considerably smaller than the other measures). This
is not surprising since we already knew that the cyclical volatility of overtime labor is about
twice that of real GDP and full time employment (see Hall, 1996) and, because it is paid with a
signicant premium, rms will choose to hire new workers for very persistent uctuations. It is
also clear that ROLC tends to comove positively with H-P detrended real GDP whereas RULC
does not (this conclusion is robust if one uses quadratically detrended real GDP instead).
Table 1 displays some key statistics for the three marginal cost measures and conrms these
observations. The ROLC is much more volatile than either RULC or H-P ltered real GDP per
capita, and much less persistent. The labor share, with a correlation of -0.14 with H-P ltered
real GDP per capita, does appear to be countercyclical. For this reason, several authors have
argued that the labor share is not a good proxy for marginal cost.13 Using overtime data to
measure real marginal cost appears to address this criticism. The ROLC series has a clearly
positive correlation (0.39) with the H-P detrended real GDP. This is consistent with Bils (1987)
and Mazumders (2010) results for the manufacturing industry whose marginal cost measures
also rely on overtime costs.14 All three series are positively correlated with current and future
ination (this is very relevant, because the most important reason why Mazumders marginal
cost measure proves to be incompatible with the NK model is that it is negatively correlated
with ination). This is consistent with the theory, as ination in the NK model is equal to
the expected discounted sum of future real marginal costs. Curiously, while the ROLC series is
positively correlated with current and future ination, it is essentially uncorrelated with past
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ination. This could be an indication that it is correctly measuring rmscurrent costs at the
margin as changes to these, from unanticipated shocks, would a¤ect current and future pricing
decisions but not prices previously set. Finally, both ROLC and H-P ltered real GDP have
positive correlation with current and future ination growth (t = t  t 1) whereas RULC
does not.
3.3 GMM estimation of the NKPC
3.3.1 Reduced form estimates of the purely forward-looking NKPC
I estimate the NKPC for both RULC and ROLC for the period 1977Q32006Q3 with GMM,
making use of the orthogonality condition
Et f(t   mct   t+1)ztg = 0; (29)
where zt is the instrument set. For robustness purposes, two sets of instruments are used. The
rst set of instruments is composed of four lags of ination, the marginal cost variable (RULC
or ROLC), the output gap (quadratically detrended output), the long-short interest rate spread,
wage ination and commodity price ination. This is the same instrument set used by Galí
and Gertler (1999). The second set of instruments is smaller in order to minimize the potential
estimation bias that is known to arise in small samples when there are too many over-identifying
restrictions (see, e.g., Staiger & Stock, 1997). It consists of only four lags of ination and two
lags of the marginal cost variable, the output gap, the long-short interest rate spread, wage
ination and commodity ination (this is similar to the instrument set used in Galí, Gertler,
& López-Salido, 2005). In all regressions a Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) weighting matrix was used with the lag order selected by Newey and Wests
(1994) optimal lag-selection algorithm.
Table 2 displays the estimation results. For RULC with both sets of instruments  is positive
but not statistically signicant at the 5% level. This is consistent with Rudd andWhelan (2007)
and Ravenna andWalsh (2008) who also obtained positive but insignicant estimates for  when
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using the labor share.15 When ROLC is used to proxy for marginal cost the estimate of  is
negative with both sets of instruments (but only at a statistically signicant level with the rst
instrument set).16 This represents a rejection of the model (a marginal cost increase should be
associated with an increase in ination). The reason why  is positive with RULC but negative
with the ROLC measure is linked to the correlation with future ination growth. This is easy
to understand if one assumes  = 1 and rearranges the NKPC as Ett+1   t =  mct. That
is, the purely forward-looking NK model predicts that real marginal cost should be negatively
related to future ination growth, which is true for the RULC measure but not for the ROLC
series (as seen in Table 1). For this same reason, negative estimates of  were also obtained by
Mazumder (2010) with a procyclical measure of marginal cost in manufacturing and Galí and
Gertler (1999) with an output gap measure.
Table 2 also reports statistics that are indicative of the quality of the instruments used. A
good instrument must be both correlated with the included endogenous variables and orthogonal
to the error. The former condition may be tested by examining the t of the rst stage
regressions.17 One rule of thumb is that for a single endogenous regressor, an F statistic below
10 is cause for concern (Staiger & Stock, 1997). The Anderson and Rubin (1949) F test of
the signicance of the endogenous regressors (denoted as A-R test) in the structural equation
being estimated readily rejects its null hypothesis. Also, both the conventional and the Angrist-
Pischke (A-P) rst stage F statistics for each endogenous regressor are included in Table 2.18
In all regressions the rst stage F statistic values reported are quite high, indicating that the
endogenous regressors are relevant. Finally, to test the validity of the orthogonality conditions
Table 2 includes the p-values of Hansens J test of overidentifying restrictions (Prob. J). In all
regressions the null hypothesis that the instruments used are exogenous is not rejected by the
J test.
3.3.2 Reduced form estimates of the hybrid NKPC
One of the central criticisms (see page 205 of Woodford, 2003) of the purely forward-looking
NK model estimated in the previous subsection is its inability to capture the apparent inertia in
16
ination (that is, lagged ination values seem an important determinant of current ination).
To address this criticism Galí and Gertler (1999) extended the NK model to allow for a subset
of rms that use a backward-looking rule of thumb. In this hybridmodel a fraction ! of
rms set its price equal to the average price chosen in the previous period, with a correction for
ination based on the lagged ination rate. The remaining rms set prices optimally subject
to Calvo constraints on price setting (as described in section 2).
Importantly, the rejection of the NK model in the previous subsection may have been caused
by model misspecication arising from the absence of lagged values of ination in the regressions
of the purely forward-looking model (leading to omitted variable bias in the estimates). I
estimate the hybrid NKPC for both RULC and ROLC according to the moment condition (for
details see Galí & Gertler, 1999):
Et

(t   hmct   ft+1   bt 1)zt
	
= 0; (30)
where
h =


(1  !);
f =


; (31)
b =
!

;
with  =  + ![1   (1   )]. The instrument sets used are those described in the previous
subsection and an identical methodology is used to correct for heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation. Table 3 displays the results. Just as in the purely forward-looking case, the coe¢ cient
on real marginal costs is positive (0.01 with the large instrument set and 0.02 with the reduced
instrument set) but not statistically signicant when the RULC series is used. Both the reduced
form coe¢ cients on lagged and expected ination are statistically signicant and of approxi-
mately similar size (with values varying between 0.4 to 0.6). These results are consistent with
those in Rudd and Whelan (2007). The estimates di¤er quite signicantly when the ROLC
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measure is adopted as a proxy for real marginal cost. In this case  is both positive (and quan-
titatively about twice as large as when the RULC series is used, with estimates varying between
0.02 to 0.04) and statistically signicant. There are equally striking di¤erences with respect to
the estimates for the reduced form coe¢ cients on lagged versus expected future ination. In
the regressions with ROLC, lagged ination is clearly predominant over expected future ina-
tion (both are, however, statistically signicant). With the large instrument set b estimate is
0.65 (about twice that of f which is 0.33) and with the reduced instrument set 0.76 (while
f is estimated to be only 0.22). The results with the ROLC also compare favorably with the
marginal cost measures of Mazumder (2010) and Ravenna and Walsh (2008) since those series
resulted in negative estimates of  for both the forward-looking NKPC and the hybrid NKPC.
As in the purely forward-looking model, the J test conrms the validity of the overidentifying
restrictions in all regressions. However, the low A-P rst stage F statistics for future ination
indicate a potential weak instruments problem in the regressions.
4 Evidence on price frequency changes and the NKmodel
To infer the degree of price frequency adjustment from the reduced form estimates one needs
rst to calibrate several other parameters (see Eqs., 25, 26) which in the case of the model with
employment frictions is all of the models parameters apart from those related to the Taylor
rule and exogenous shocks. However, values for the latter are also set in the calibration section
in order to plot impulse response functions to illustrate the intuition for the results.
The rst subsection describes the choice of parameter values, the second subsection explains
the importance of employment frictions to reconcile NKPC estimates with the micro evidence
on price adjustment and nally the last subsection presents results for the NK models struc-
tural parameters obtained from the reduced form estimates of the last section under certain
assumptions on factor specicity.
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4.1 Calibration
The period length is one quarter and the discount rate is set at  = 0:99. I assume a value of
one for , the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The representative agents leisure utility
parameter v and the labor supply elasticity  are calibrated so that N1 = 0:46 and N2 = 0:16
(their time series means in per capita terms). The agents time endowment, T , is set at 1369,
implying agents have 15 hours per day available for work and leisure activities. I assume the
straight time shift to be 40 hours a week, implying a quarterly value of 516 for h1. I choose the
overtime shift h2 to be equal to 155, the mean of overtime hours.
I choose  = 7:6667 (which implies a frictionless steady state markup of 15%),  is set
at 0.33, the quit rate in employment (N1) is chosen to be 0.1 (consistent with the empirical
evidence for the U.S., see Shimer, 2005) and  N1, the curvature on labor adjustment costs, to
be 2 (the midpoint estimate of Cooper & Willis, 2002). The values of ; ;  and  are the
same as in Woodford (2005).
For the stochastic shocks and interest rate rule I adopt the same calibration as Galí (2008).
So A is set at 0.9 and s is assumed to be equal to 0.5. The ination and output weights
(; y) of the Taylor rule are set at 1.5 and 0.125 respectively, which are consistent with
observed variations in the Federal Funds rate over the Greenspan era (see Taylor, 1999).
4.2 Implications of employment frictions for the frequency of price
adjustment
The small estimates of the slope of the NKPC, , in the literature imply a period of price
stickiness much larger than that found using micro data. The Calvo price staggering assumption
implies an average time period for which a price is xed of 1=(1 ). The typical value estimated
(e.g., Galí & Gertler, 1999),  > 0:8, then implies the average time period between price changes
to be larger than ve quarters. Table 4 reports estimates from Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) for
the mean monthly fraction of items changing prices, fr, using micro data (from New York, Los
Angeles and Chicago). These estimates imply an average price duration (APD) of 3.4 months
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(APD = 1=fr = 3
1  ) for all prices (4.3 months excluding sales) resulting in a value of  of 0.12
(0.3 if one excludes sales).
In this subsection, I explore how introducing employment frictions helps reconcile this ap-
parent discrepancy between macro and micro estimations. Table 5 shows the values of  (and
APD) implied by a given estimate of  (which in the literature vary mostly between 0.020.05).
Three di¤erent cases are considered. The Basic New Keynesian model (no employment fric-
tions) under constant returns to scale (denoted as CRS,  is set to 0), the Basic New Keynesian
model (no employment frictions) under decreasing returns to scale (DRS,  is set to 0.33), , and
in the last column the New Keynesian model with overtime labor and employment frictions.
Apart from the CRS case where  is equal to zero, all other parameters are set as described in
previous subsection.
I begin by looking at the CRS case since it is the most commonly assumed in the literature.
This is clearly not consistent with the micro evidence reported by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005).
Even for high values of  the implied average price duration is higher than ve quarters. We
can see that under the DRS model there is a signicant reduction in the implied price stickiness
value (the values of  vary between 0.7 and 0.6), yet it still falls very far behind the values
in the micro estimations, especially for the lowest values of . These values are very close to
those obtained by Woodford (2005) in a rm-specic capital model, which is not surprising
since the DRS model is essentially a model with xed capital.19 Adding employment frictions
has, however, a much larger e¤ect, with  varying between 0.4 and 0.3.20 Even for the lowest
values of  the average price duration implied by the employment frictions model seems to be
quite consistent with the micro evidence.
The di¤erence in the frequency of price adjustment resulting from the introduction of em-
ployment frictions is well illustrated by the impulse response functions of the two models de-
scribed in section 2. I set  at 0.03 so that the two models are equivalent at the aggregate
level. The remaining parameters are set as described in the calibration section. Figure 2 dis-
plays the responses of ination and output for both models to a 1% productivity shock while
gure 3 displays the responses for a 1% monetary policy shock. As can be clearly seen in both
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gures, for what are about the same changes in output the reaction of ination to either shock
is clearly larger in the model with employment frictions indicating signicantly more frequent
price adjustments.
The intuition is as follows: under decreasing returns to scale or in the presence of employ-
ment frictions, a rms marginal cost is no longer independent of its own level of output (and a
considerably steeper function of output under employment frictions). A rm that contemplates
raising its price understands that this implies less demand and therefore less output. The re-
duced output implies a lower marginal cost. Other things being equal, the lower marginal cost
induces a prot maximizing rm to post a lower price. The introduction of employment fric-
tions then induces price-adjusting rms to keep their relative price close to the non-adjusters.
Hence, the sluggishness of ination responses to changes in output (low estimates of ) can be
reconciled with individual rms exibility in changing prices.
Why is the e¤ect of the introduction of employment frictions so strong (while capital is
not)? The explanation seems to be in the output share of the constrained production factor.
In the DRS model, the constrained factor share, , is half of the unconstrained factor share
(the labor input), whereas in the employment frictions model the constrained factor, full time
employment, represents the most signicant production factor (h1N1 is about 4 times larger
than h2N2). Consider a value of  of 0.02. If  were to be double it would imply a  = 0:575;
a signicantly smaller value. Alternatively, reducing the size of the straight time labor input
relative to the overtime input in the employment frictions model leads to a substantial rise in
the implied period between price adjustments. Lowering the steady state value of N1 to 0.20
and the straight time shift (h1) to 200 results in a value of  equal to 0.632. Capital simply does
not represent a large enough proportion of rms costs for the introduction of realistic levels of
frictions in this factor to su¢ ciently reduce the elasticity of the desired price with respect to
output.
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4.3 Structural estimates of the NK model
The reduced form equation estimates are valid independently of the assumptions made regarding
capital or employment rigidities. However, as noted by Woodford (2005) estimation of the
NKPC provides no direct evidence regarding the frequency of price adjustment, nor any way
of testing which of the alternative possible assumptions about the specicity of factor markets
is the correct one.Therefore, estimates of the structural parameters are highly conditioned by
modelling assumptions and should be interpreted with care.
Structural parameters estimates for the two real marginal cost measures for both the purely
forward-looking NKPC and hybrid NKPC are reported respectively in Tables 6 and 7 (the
delta method was applied to nd the standard errors). For the RULC series these estimates are
obtained under the DRS case while for the ROLC the employment frictions model was used.
For the purely forward-looking model the estimated values of  are close to 0.7 for the labor
share with either instrument set. With the ROLC series the values found are nonsensical (not
surprisingly since the theory requires  > 0). For the hybrid model  is found to be in the range
0.50.6 for the regressions with RULC while for the regressions with ROLC  is between 0.20.3.
The lower values for ROLC are the result of both a higher coe¢ cient slope on marginal costs
from the reduced form estimates and also of the assumption of employment frictions. Under
the DRS assumption  would be 0.42 with instrument set 1 and 0.26 with instrument set 2.
The implied estimates of the fraction of backward-looking rms (!) are in the 0.50.6 range
for the ROLC series and in the 0.60.7 range for RULC. This is quite surprising given that
the coe¢ cients on lagged ination are actually larger for the ROLC series. These results are in
line with Rudd and Whelans (2007) concerns on the di¢ culty of interpreting estimates on the
relative importance of backward versus forward-looking behavior from hybrid models.
The estimation results (shown in the web appendix) in this and the prior section are robust
to controlling for outliers and restricting  equal to unity (which implies b + f = 1 in the
hybrid model).
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5 Conclusion
This paper describes a NK model with straight time and overtime labor. The introduction of
employment frictions allows the model to be consistent with both the micro evidence on the
frequency of price adjustment and the reaction of ination to movements in aggregate labor
costs. Since rms are only allowed to change overtime hours to react to unexpected shocks,
this model implies that rmsmarginal costs should be measured by overtime work costs. I
construct a marginal cost measure based on overtime costs which unlike the labor share is
found to be procyclical. GMM estimation results using this new marginal cost measure are
in accordance with theory (and statistically signicant) for the hybrid NKPC but not for the
purely forward-looking NKPC. Another important result is that lagged ination is found to
be quantitatively much more relevant than expected future ination in estimates of the hybrid
NKPC. The empirical results in this paper therefore suggest that overtime labor is important
to obtain a more plausible measure of rmsmarginal costs and that it is also necessary to
include backward-looking behavior for a good description of ination dynamics.
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Notes
1In chapter 3 Galí (2008) shows that log deviations in real marginal cost (mct) from steady
state are positively related the log deviation of output from its exible price counterpart, the
output gap (~yt), in the basic NK model (that is mct = ~yt where  > 0). Woodford (2003,
p.181) shows this conclusion is not special to the particular structure of production costs and
demand assumedand is true in a broad class of standard models. For real marginal cost to
be countercyclical it would have to be the case that the business cycle is mostly driven by pro-
ductivity shocks, since due to price stickiness output would not increase as much as its exible
counterpart. For all other conventional shocks (e.g, those considered in Smets and Wouters,
2007), even for other supply shocks such as wage-mark up shocks, the NKmodel predicts output
to be positively correlated with the output gap. However the NK model also predicts a negative
impact of productivity on hours worked. Given the strongly positive correlation between output
and hours worked over the business cycle this implies that it would be hard to reconcile the
NK model with a predominant role for productivity shocks over the cycle. The work of both
Smets and Wouters (2007) and Galí and Rabanal (2004) conrms that productivity shocks do
not seem to play a dominant role in driving output.
2The model allows for adjustment along both the intensive (changes in overtime employment)
and extensive margin (changes in straight time employment) in hours. In the data, most
uctuations in aggregate hours worked come from the extensive margin. However, in standard
versions of the NK model all uctuations in aggregate hours are made along the intensive
margin (that is, all the variation is in hours per worker). In this context it is relevant to make
reference to the search-match literature which has also introduced uctuations in aggregate
hours worked resulting from the extensive margin in NK models, e.g., Walsh (2005), Trigari
(2009) and Blanchard and Galí (2010).
3This is consistent with the work of Hamermesh (1993) which shows that hours per worker
adjust more rapidly than employment.
4For a reference on the e¤ects of overtime pay regulation see Trejo (1991).
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5The fact that Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) ltered overtime employment is about twice as
volatile as real GDP or straight time labor (see Hall, 1996) conrms there is an important
business cycle dimension to it.
6This shift workproduction function was developed by Lucas (1970) and shown to be more
consistent with observed cyclical patterns in production and real wages than the standard
neoclassical and the xed factor proportions production functions. Other papers which also
make use of this production function are Sargent and Wallace (1974) and Sargent (1978).
7Studies using aggregate quarterly data, summarized in Hamermesh (1993), show the average
lag in adjusting employment demand to be three to six months. At the micro level, employment
adjustment costs are also found to be signicant (for a survey see Hamermesh & Pfann, 1996),
with some studies suggesting they amount to as much as one year payroll for the average worker.
8Please see the web appendix for details, concerning this subsection.
9The X-12-ARIMA lter was adopted whenever seasonally adjusted data was not available,
except for the interest rate series which were left unadjusted.
10The series for N1;t was obtained by subtracting the number of part time workers (persons
working less than 35 hours a week) from the total number of workers. A series for total overtime
hours was obtained by removing total part time hours and straight time hours (assuming
the straight time shift to be 40 hours per week) from the total number of hours worked in
nonagricultural industries. This series was then divided by N2;t to obtain the average overtime
shift series (h2;t) which was then converted to quarterly by assuming a month to be equal to 4.3
weeks and summing the resulting monthly observations. The necessary data to obtain N1;t; N2;t
and h2;t has only been collected by the BLS since June 1976:
11The labstat codes of the BLS series used are: LNU02033235, LNU02033241, LNS12032197,
LNU02033182, LNS12033120, LNS12035019 and LNU02033116. The series ID for the St. Louis
Fed data are: CNP16OV, COMPRNFB, CUSR0000SAC, GDPC1, GDPDEF, GS1, GS10 and
PRS85006173.
12In the model considered here the overtime shift is xed, but since this represents another
means by which rms can also vary overtime labor, I make use of the data available in this
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aspect as well (the empirical results obtained are robust to either using a xed or variable
overtime shift).
13Rudd and Whelan (2007), point out that the labor share tends to jump upward and reach
a local peak near the onset of the NBER recessions.For the labor share to be a good proxy
for real marginal cost and for real marginal cost to have a positive correlation with the output
gap (which is implied by NK theory, as shown in chapter 3 of Galí, 2008), would imply that
output was actually above potential during economic recessions.
14There are however several di¤erences between ROLC and the marginal cost measure con-
sidered by Bils (1987) and Mazumder (2010). Bils and Mazumders methodology is dependent
on estimating a marginal wage schedule from average hours per worker (and on the function
assumed for the marginal wage schedule). Also, Bils and Mazumders marginal cost measure
can only be computed for the manufacturing sector since the data used is not available at the
aggregate level. On the other hand, Bils (1987) and Mazumder (2010) do not assume that the
marginal product of overtime labor is independent from the amount of straight time labor hired
by the rm, which is assumed in the production function (10) used here and in Hall (1996). It
is therefore not clear that one methodology is preferable to the other.
15Ravenna and Walsh (2008) explain why Galí and Gertlers (1999) result is no longer ob-
tained in updated samples (Galí & Gertlers, 1999, estimates were obtained with data from
1960Q1 to 1997Q4): The cross-correlation between ination and unit labor cost (Fig. 5)
shows why the very fact of extending the sample up to 2007 causes the relationship to break
down. Ination is positively correlated with contemporaneous and future values of unit labor
cost up to 1994 as predicted by the theory while the cross-correlation is reversed in the
sample 19952007.
16Mazumder (2010) and Ravenna and Walsh (2008) obtained similar results (negative coef-
cient estimates) when estimating the New Keynesian Phillips Curve with models that also
allowed for adjustment along both the intensive and extensive margin in hours.
17These statistics were obtained by using an extension to Statas ivregress command devel-
oped by Baum, Scha¤er and Stillman (2010).
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18The conventional rst stage F statistic can be misleading with multiple endogenous vari-
ables, since it would have high values in cases when some instruments are strongly correlated
with several endogenous variables while others are weak predictors. To correct for this Angrist
and Pischke (2009) developed a modication of the rst-stage F statistic.
19Sveen and Weinke (2004) when comparing the DRS model with the rm-specic capital
model had already previously observed that: The functional form of the ination equation itself
is only a¤ected to some negligible extent by the feature of endogenous capital accumulation at
the rm level.
20These results are robust to di¤erent values of the employment adjustment cost function
( N1 and N1). For  = 0:02, lowering the value of the separation rate (N1) to 0.03 does not
change the implied value of . For this same  estimate, increasing the curvature on employment
adjustment costs ( N1) from 2 to 3 would only raise  from 0.456 to 0.458. Lowering N1to
0.03 and  N1 to 0.5 would make  equal to 0.439.
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6 Tables
Table 1: Comparison of marginal cost measures (1977Q32006Q3)
Stand. Dev. Correlation with
t 1 t t+1 t t+1 yt RULCt 1 ROLCt 1 yt 1
RULCt 0.021 0.59 0.57 0.55 -0.05 -0.05 -0.14 0.91
ROLCt 0.031 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.17 0.39 0.69
yt 0.014 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.11 0.09 1.00 0.86
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Table 2: GMM reduced form estimates of the purely forward-looking NKPC (1977Q32006Q3)
Instrument set 1 Instrument set 2
coef. est. st. err. F test A-P F test coef. est. st. err. F test A-P F test
t+1 0.958 (0.024) 65.36 50.83 0.968 (0.061) 27.32 22.89
RULCt 0.037 (0.019) 168.09 58.24 0.039 (0.049) 127.32 60.03
Prob. J 0.980 A-R test 120.79 Prob. J 0.777 A-R test 124.62
t+1 0.992 (0.017) 70.63 73.44 1.003 (0.037) 29.06 29.84
ROLCt -0.034 (0.015) 39.95 38.43 -0.021 (0.023) 30.98 27.42
Prob. J 0.993 A-R test 164.02 Prob. J 0.709 A-R test 122.67
Inst. set 1: four lags of ination, the marginal cost variable, detrended output, the long-short
interest rate spread, wage ination and commodity ination. Inst. set 2: four lags of ination
and two lags of the marginal cost variable, detrended output, the long-short interest rate spread,
wage ination and commodity ination. In all regressions a Newey-West heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) weighting matrix was used with lag order selected by Newey
and Wests (1994) optimal lag-selection algorithm. HAC standard errors are shown in brackets.
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Table 3: GMM reduced form estimates of the hybrid NKPC (1977Q32006Q3)
Instrument set 1 Instrument set 2
coef. est. st. err. F test A-P F test coef. est. st. err. F test A-P F test
t 1 0.544 (0.037) 437.95 30.02 0.583 (0.050) 398.79 33.72
t+1 0.441 (0.042) 189.03 14.20 0.396 (0.055) 89.56 6.43
RULCt 0.011 (0.009) 418.15 174.72 0.018 (0.011) 310.76 173.92
Prob. J 0.999 A-R test 200.46 Prob. J 0.846 A-R test 243.02
t 1 0.648 (0.057) 434.65 16.34 0.757 (0.079) 314.55 18.23
t+1 0.334 (0.061) 206.71 5.72 0.222 (0.082) 97.05 6.08
ROLCt 0.023 (0.010) 108.03 92.78 0.042 (0.017) 62.19 27.33
Prob. J 0.999 A-R test 184.93 Prob. J 0.832 A-R test 184.17
Inst. set 1: four lags of ination, the marginal cost variable, detrended output, the long-short
interest rate spread, wage ination and commodity ination. Inst. set 2: four lags of ination
and two lags of the marginal cost variable, detrended output, the long-short interest rate spread,
wage ination and commodity ination. In all regressions a Newey-West heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) weighting matrix was used with lag order selected by Newey
and Wests (1994) optimal lag-selection algorithm. HAC standard errors are shown in brackets.
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Table 4: Micro evidence on the frequency of price adjustment
Sample fr implied APD implied 
1. All Items
All prices 0.293 3.413 0.121
Regular prices 0.233 4.292 0.301
2. Core Items
All prices 0.26 3.846 0.220
Regular prices 0.207 4.831 0.379
The rst column is from Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) and gives the mean fraction of chang-
ing monthly prices, fr. APD is the implied mean number of months for which a price remains
xed. The last column gives us the implied probability of a price being xed for a quarter
(APD = 1=fr = 3
1  ).
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Table 5: Implications for average price duration
of alternative assumptions about factor markets
CRS ( = 0) DRS ( = 0:33) Employment Frictions
  APD  APD  APD
0.05 0.804 15.268 0.619 7.867 0.308 4.335
0.04 0.823 16.916 0.651 8.588 0.344 4.570
0.03 0.845 19.345 0.689 9.651 0.390 4.919
0.02 0.872 23.468 0.738 11.454 0.456 5.514
 is the implied probability of a price being xed for a quarter. APD is the implied mean
number of months for which a price remains xed (APD = 3
1  ).
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Table 6: Structural estimates of the purely forward-looking NKPC (1977Q32006Q3)
RULC ROLC
 
Inst. set 1 0.672 1.034
(0.069) (54.530)
Inst. set 2 0.660 1.016
(0.169) (18.127)
Inst. set 1: four lags of ination, the marginal cost variable, detrended output, the long-
short interest rate spread, wage ination and commodity ination. Inst. set 2: four lags of
ination and two lags of the marginal cost variable, detrended output, the long-short interest
rate spread, wage ination and commodity ination.
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Table 7: Structural estimates of the hybrid NKPC (1977Q32006Q3)
RULC ROLC
!   !  
Inst. set 1 0.660 0.908 0.590 0.547 0.892 0.316
(0.173) (0.166) (0.057) (0.172) (0.171) (0.135)
Inst. set 2 0.654 0.868 0.512 0.584 0.815 0.210
(0.162) (0.175) (0.035) (0.168) (0.168) (0.225)
Inst. set 1: four lags of ination, the marginal cost variable, detrended output, the long-
short interest rate spread, wage ination and commodity ination. Inst. set 2: four lags of
ination and two lags of the marginal cost variable, detrended output, the long-short interest
rate spread, wage ination and commodity ination.
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7 Figures
Figure 1: Marginal Cost Measures (1977Q32006Q3)
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Figure 2: Ination and output responses to a 1% Productivity Shock
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Figure 3: Ination and output responses to a 1% Monetary Policy Shock
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